ABSTRACT Sensitive files in computer systems such as executable programs, configuration, and authorization information have a great importance of their own, in terms of both confidentiality and functionality. To protect sensitive files, an effective approach named as file integrity monitoring is proposed to detect aggressive behaviors by verifying all the actions on these sensitive files. However, due to semantic gap problems, current file integrity monitoring tools are incapable of monitoring files in memory, so that an illegal modification of a file may bypass the detection by deliberately hiding itself inside the cache without actually committing to the disk. In this paper, we propose a runtime sensitive file integrity monitoring system named Vanguard, to satisfy the requirement of cache-level file protection. It can monitor both IO operations and cache operations, thereby deterring the illegal file accesses. To achieve the cache-level monitoring, we explore the techniques to detect when sensitive files are loaded into and swapped out from the operating system page cache. Vanguard is isolated from the monitored system so it is hard to be subverted. We implement Vanguard on QEMU/KVM platform, and both Linux and Windows guest operating systems are supported. We conduct several experiments, and the experimental results show the effectiveness of Vanguard and imply that our method incurs acceptable overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
File protection has always attracted considerable interest in both industry and academia, since almost all the data and information are stored in files in modern computer systems. Many of the security accidents are relevant to unauthorized file accesses, such as the recent outbreak of Wannacry ransomware attack [1] . Sophisticated attackers may hook Trojan or back-door programs on the normal daemons, steal the confidential information and then hide their trace by tampering the system logging. File integrity monitoring is an effective approach to discover these aggressive behaviors by verifying all the accesses to sensitive files.
Traditional file integrity monitoring techniques such as Tripwire [2] , AIDE [3] , and Osiris [4] usually resides in the operating system, as an agent or a kernel module. As they are executing on the monitored system, these approaches are exposed to the attackers, which increases the risk of being bypassed or subverted.
Virtual machine based security mechanism provides a novel way to reduce these risks, because the feature of isolation provided by VM architecture can solidify the monitoring system [5] , [6] . In VM based approaches, monitoring services are always built into the VMM, a layer between underlying equipment and upper operating system. So they cannot be detected or subverted by malwares. Existing VM based file integrity monitoring tools fall into two types: One is represented by Xiang et al. [7] and Gupta et al. [8] , which periodically checks the attributes of the files such as hash value and modification time, and then verify whether the files have been tampered or not. The other type is runtime monitoring, for example, Xenfit [9] and DynaRace [10] . They always intercept the files related system calls or device drivers, obtain the application contexts at the breakpoint and then compare them with black and white lists.
Due to the semantic gap problems, however, the above file integrity monitoring techniques cannot intercept cachelevel file access, they only concern about monitoring files and IO operations in the external storage. But in practice, file exists not only in external storage but also main memory. Note that memory is more close to CPU. If a file block has already been loaded into the system page cache, it will be directly reused without accessing the disk again. Current approaches can intercept and shield all the illegal IO access to file, but they cannot shield the illegal cache access. One potential result is that an illegal file modification may bypass any IO-based detection as it can deliberately hide itself inside the cache without actually committing to the disk; Intruders who tamper the page cache rather than the source file would make the system or user get the contaminated data. To ameliorate this problem, many have also attempted to build higher-assurance execution environments. Systems like Overshadow [11] and Ink-Tag [12] can guarantee that the memory tampering actions will be detected before next access. But they provide just warnings, they cannot prevent illegal memory cache modification from happening. Other efforts such as Virtual ghost, TrustZone and SGX [13] - [16] explored to change the original architecture into a protection mode. Unfortunately, these generally demand major changes in the way that applications are written and used. Such radical departures pose a substantial barrier to adoption. This paper proposes Vanguard, a runtime sensitive file integrity monitoring system in the virtual machine environment, which mitigates the semantic gap problems. It can be used by VMM to monitor block device IO operations and page-cache operations, hence to protect sensitive files on both cache-level and storage-level. Vanguard is transparent and there is no need to append any module in the monitored system. For each VM, all files are classified into three categories based on the pre-defined protection level: ordinary file, readonly file, and non-accessible file. Once there is an access that tries to violate security policy, we hop that instruction, log and report it to the administrator. To achieve the cache-level monitor, Vanguard uses a page cache allocation detection techniques to identify the sensitive file's cache location. And then adds traps to target addresses so it can intercept operations accessing the corresponding cache. Since operating systems may reclaim page caches when memory resource is exhausted, we also propose a page cache reuse detection technique and remove corresponding traps when page cache reclamation is detected. Cache operations are of high frequency, while the operations that illegally access sensitive file's cache are always low-frequent. In Vanguard, only illegally cache accesses trigger the trap. Therefore, the overall overhead of Vanguard is acceptable.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We present Vanguard, an efficient sensitive file integrity monitoring system which is applicable to both Linux and Windows operating systems. It can intercept both file operations and cache operations, thereby deterring anyone and any action which tries to access sensitive file illegally. Vanguard is transparent to upper VM and hard to be subverted. It not only provides protection for files in storage, but also the ones cached in memory.
• We proposed page cache location detection and page cache reuse detection techniques in VMM to perceive where the files are cached and when they are evicted from guest's memory. It is the basis to cache-level file integrity monitoring.
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the very first one who present the method that can provide cache-level sensitive file integrity monitoring.
• We implement Vanguard on QEMU/KVM [17] platform. It supports a majority of popular virtual disks formats. Experiments are performed to demonstrate Vanguard's effectiveness and efficiency. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We introduce the related works in the next section. Section III describes the threaten model and gives examples of potential attackers against existing file protection tools. Section IV and V presents the overview and design of the systems. The implementation details of Vanguard are described in Section VI. We evaluate the effectiveness and performance in Section VII. Finally in Section IX, we conclude and discuss the future direction of Vanguard.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we introduce the related works. We start by discussing file integrity monitor and then higher-assurance execution environments. Since our scheme is related to cache monitoring, we also discuss previous works that infer cache location in the VMM.
A. FILE INTEGRITY MONITORING
Earlier works usually execute on the monitored systems. Tripwire [2] , AIDE [3] , Osiris and Samhain [4] are representative examples. They use the digital signature comparison to identify possible changes of the monitored files and report all the suspected changes to the administrator. The problem is that they all have the ''delay detection'' trouble. Intruders may issue the attack between the inspection intervals. This is caused by the designed scheme, so there is no perfect solution for it. SNARE [18] and I3FS [19] are implemented in filesystem layer and they intercept and track down the related VFS system calls, so they can detect when a specific file is changed in real-time. Nevertheless, they require to patch the kernel of the monitored system, which is not always acceptable in the production system.
With the prevalence of virtualization technology, VMbased security becomes increasingly important. Jin et al. [20] monitor all the VM's system calls and detect the malicious one out-of-the-VM. VMon [21] and Jiang et al.'s [22] work both intercept the IO operations in VMM, and recognize the IO information by guest view reconstruction. The isolation provided by VMM enhances the security of these detectors.
The problem remains, however, existing VM-based method cannot monitor sensitive files in cache since it is difficult to detect the cache location. In contrast to these works, we overcome the semantic gap problem between cache information and the low-level binary states information. Vanguard employs cache allocation and reclamation detect technique to accurately locate the sensitive file's cache, and then monitors it.
B. HIGHER-ASSURANCE EXECUTION ENVIRONMENTS
Several previous systems attempt to build higher-assurance execution environments to protect applications from being attacked by untrusted operating systems. Such methods can also protect sensitive files to some extent. Xu et al. [23] and Rhee et al. [24] use VM introspection and interposition technology control access to sensitive kernel objects in a single VM, thus to guarantee the integrity of the OS Kernel. However, they protect the kernel objects such as kernel text and interrupt table, but fail to prevent the illegal memory access to file system cache. In addition, their performance loss is significant. Chen et al. [11] , Hofmann et al. [12] , and Kwon et al. [25] are also built on VM hypervisor. They provide application an encrypted memory view from the OS, and use hash values to detect corruption of the physical pages caused by the OS. But they do not prevent the illegal access to encrypted pages. Other efforts such as KCoFI [15] Virtual Ghost [14] , TrustZone [16] , [26] , [27] and SGX [13] explored to change the original architecture into a protection mode. Unfortunately, these generally demand major changes in the way that applications are written and used. Such radical departures pose a substantial barrier to adoption.
C. CACHE LOCATION INFERENCE
The recent works that use cache location inferring techniques in virtualization environment aim at improving the system performance. For example, Yamaguchi and Fujishima's [28] work detects disk cache in the guest system from VMM-layer and then counts the page cache hit ratio. By delivering this knowledge to the memory management module such as balloon, it improves the performance of I/O intensive applications in virtual machines. But this method needs to modify the guest OS, which is adverse to our assumption. S-CAVE [29] proposes an effective approach to determine the demand for SSD cache space of each VM, and then shares the cache space by incorporating cache demand for the goal of best utilizing the cache. But this approach is designed for SSD cache, not memory cache. Jones et al. [30] propose Geiger, a technique that can be used by VMM to passively infer when pages are inserted into and evicted from guest's buffer cache. Geiger uses numerous heuristics to detect the cache location. By accurately recognizing the location, Geiger can estimate the working set size and allows VMM to make more efficient memory allocation decisions. Geiger also improves the hit rate of remote storage caches by using eviction-based cache placement without modifying the application or operating system storage interface. However, the Geiger technique is restricted to hypervisors which use shadow page table to manage virtual memory, which is rarely used today for the sack of low performance. When EPT [31] or RVI [32] is enabled, Geiger will lose efficacy. That's because Geiger takes advantage of observing all the guest page faults and guest page table updates, but these events will not be notified to the hypervisor in modern hardware-assisted memory virtualization.
Vanguard's cache detection technique is inspired by these works, but it is different from two aspects: First, the goal of cache detection in Vanguard is to monitor the sensitive files, which requires high-accuracy. Second, Vanguard achieves cache inferring by utilizing the VM introspection [33] .
III. ATTACK MODEL
In this section, we describe our assumption for Vanguard and introduce some potential threats that might pursue within this threat model.
A. ASSUMPTION
In this paper, we assume that VMM is trustworthy while guest VMs are unreliable. Our goal is to preserve sensitive file's integrity and confidentiality. An attacker will try to compromise part of the guest OS and then access sensitive file and its cache. However, they cannot escape the VM and corrupt the underlying VMM. This is a common assumption in full virtualized environments because the VMM is much smaller and stable than the guest OS and the interface between guest VM and VMM is limited to perform malicious behavior. Denial of service attacks are not part of the attack model. We also do not protect against side-channel attacks or stealing data via graphics memory; previous works such as Xenfit [9] , Overshadow [11] and InkTag [12] do not protect against these attacks either, whereas hardware solutions such as ARM's TrustZone [16] and Intel's SGX [13] do.
B. POTENTIAL ATTACKS
Within the threat model described above, there are several potential attacks that intruders can take to violate file's confidentiality or integrity. We describe the general idea behind each attack and provide concrete example attack.
1) ATTACK THROUGH IO
Attackers will attempt to access sensitive data by directly performing illegal IO operations, or interpolating normal IO operations. For example, attackers can read or tamper sensitive files by adding backdoors in the VFS system calls.
2) ATTACK IN MEMORY
The potential threats that may break existing file protection tools are launched by means of tampering page cache. This attack may occur if a modified file is not reflected in the external storage that is being examined. Since page cache is more close to the CPU, attackers who tamper the page cache will directly lead to the fact that users and applications get polluted data. they can avoid any detection by stealthily VOLUME 6, 2018 hiding themselves inside the cache without committing to the disk. Table 1 shows a typical cache attack in concurrent systems. An attack replaces the sensitive code such as a library with malicious code in page cache before an application loads it, and consequently breaks the system.
IV. OVERVIEW
In this section, we present the overview of the Vanguard. We firstly introduce the design Objectives and then describe security policy and overall monitoring architecture to achieve the goals.
A. DESIGN OBJECTIVES 1) DETECTION CAPABILITY
Our solution should perform cache monitoring and provide the capability to defend cache attack mentioned above, which is incapable for existing approaches.
2) TRANSPARENCY
Vanguard should not perturb the proper functioning of the VM being monitored. Since memory reclamation happens frequently, system inconsistency may be incurred when continuously monitoring a page cache being reclaimed. Therefore, a method to perceive cache location and cache reclamation is needed.
3) REAL-TIME Our solution should perform real-time detection when configured sensitive files are violated by malicious intruders. And then take prompt reactions such as hopping the instruction, killing the process and logging the crime scene.
4) COMPATIBILITY
Our solution should be compatible with most mainstream guest OS and file systems. We intend to support both Windows and Linux. In addition, it should not require any modification of the guest OS.
B. SECURITY POLICY
In guest OS, files usually have privilege attributes such as owner, group, readable (r), writable (w) and executable (e), which can prevent illegal access. Yet this mechanism is ineffective to the super users (administrator or root). Attackers who elevate their privilege may breach this intrinsic access control mechanism and get the ability to tamper sensitive files. Therefore, we define a unified access control mechanism for all guest system users. Any operation violates the access permission should follow the deter and report policy: we stop the operation and report it in the system log. For each VM, all files can be configured to three privileges which represent different protection-levels:
readonly files: The user can read or execute this file, but all the modification for these files will be strictly forbidden.
The executable files, library and configuration files (e.g. files in /usr/bin, /lib, windows/system32 and /etc) are also suitable for this privilege.
non-accessible files: Any access to these files is not allowed. Only confidential files are suitable for this privilege. This privilege is usually adopted when VM owner shares or assigns the VM to other users.
ordinary files: Other files except for readonly and nonaccessible files, temporary and inessential files are suitable for this privilege. For example, directory /tmp in Linux keeps the temporary data during process execution. All operations on these files should be allowed, and they should not be recorded in the log file.
In our approach, the file privileges can be configured by VM owner. And the configurations should have been done before launching the VM. For convenience, we also present an auto-configure function which assigns each file with a default privilege. Figure 1 illustrates the overall monitoring system architecture. Vanguard achieves transparency by moving monitoring facilities out of the monitored VM without any modification of the guest OS. To achieve the capability to defend cache attacks, Vanguard also intercepts and analyzes file accesses in real-time on both cache-level and IO-level. The two-level monitoring methods are based on two key enabling techniques: 1. Reconstruct the disk state (Section V-A) 2. Infer the cache location of files (Section V-B).
C. OVERALL MONITORING ARCHITECTURE
As described in Figure 1 , IO-level is the first monitoring level. In this monitoring level, we prevent all write operations on readonly and non-accessible files; At the same time, we also prohibit read operations associated with nonaccessible files, so only read-only files and ordinary files will be loaded into the memory cache. The secondary level is cache-level. Since non-accessible files are prohibited from being loaded into memory at the first level, so that we only need to ensure that the in-cache read-only files are not being written in this level. Note that it is impossible to intercept each memory access operation for access control due to the significant performance loss, because memory access rate is far higher than disk operations, it may reach up to millions per second. In Vanguard, we add traps that are only being triggered when readonly files' cache is about to be written. The operations associated with non-buffered areas and ordinary files' cache will not trigger a trap. So the overall overhead is acceptable, because cache operations are of high frequency, but the operations that trigger interceptions are always lowfrequent. 
V. ENABLING TECHNIQUES
In this section, we discuss the techniques used by Vanguard. 
A. DISK STATE RECONSTRUCTION
For VMM, the virtual disk is a bunch of raw sectors. When VMM simulates guest IO operations, the upper layer guest OS only gives it IO vector as the parameter (its fields are listed in Table 2 ). From the IO vector, we can not determine whether an IO operation is illegal. So we take use of IO semantic reconstruction techniques to build the relationship between files and raw data arranged in the virtual disk. This builds on the previous work of VMWatcher [22] . We observe that the target file system data structures definition reveals how files and directories are organized in virtual disk and it can be used as templates to interpret raw data. Therefore, given a sensitive file, we can recognize its corresponding disk sectors. In other words, every single disk sector's access privilege can be identified.
The identification result is the basis of the IO-level monitor. Based on the result, we intercept each IO operation in VMM, and then determine how to deal with them by checking the sector field of IO vector parameter. Since the VMM emulates all disk I/O, disk reads and writes initiated by guests are explicitly visible to VMM. So no further action is required to intercept IO.
B. CACHE INFERRING
Cache inferring is the most important technique in Vanguard. We begin by providing a relevant background of how modern operating systems manage their cache. This will help to understand how and why Vanguard performs complex cache inferring. Then we describe the basic techniques used by Vanguard to infer page cache allocation and reclamation for readonly files.
1) PAGE CACHE MECHANISM
Page cache is a set of pages originating from an external storage, which can accelerate the access speed to the data contents. Cache allocation occurs when disk pages are added to the cache. The pages will be kept in the cache for a period of time and can then be directly reused without accessing the disk again. Modern operating systems, including Linux and Windows, keep the page cache in memory and manage them in virtual memory management unit (MMU). Cache reclamation may happen when the memory is exhausted: the cache pages will be free by MMU at an indefinite time and then be reused when other applications request them. The previous cached contents will remain available to be reloaded from disk at any time.
To ensure that the page cache of read-only files is not being written throughout the whole life cycle (from allocating to reclaiming). Vanguard should first, tracks whether the readonly files are loaded into cache. If so, the write protection for corresponding pages should take effect. Second, it must detect when page cache is freed by the OS, and then release write protection before it being reused. We describe each of these steps in turn. Note that the following details we discuss are only for readonly file's cache.
2) ALLOCATION DETECT AND ACTIVATING WRITE PROTECTION
Since cache allocation occurs when disk pages are added to the cache, we detect it when IO operation arises. In detection process, Vanguard should associate disk sectors with each physical memory page. This necessary information can be acquired from one of the IO parameter called IO vector, because IO vectors contain both the offset of the data segment VOLUME 6, 2018 in the disk and the corresponding pointer to the memory address. The association will persist until it is replaced by another association or the memory page is freed.
For example, when reading a readonly file from disk, Vanguard obtains associated memory pages from IO vector. Then We set those pages' second level page table entries with not-writable permission (e.g. assign value 0b101 to bits [2:0] of an EPT paging-structure entry on x86 architecture). Consequently, all of the write operations upon those pages will trigger VM-exit which transfers the control to VMM. 1 When the guest OS completely overwrites a sensitive file, guest OS will not read the file from a disk to the page cache. Instead, it directly allocates and writes data into page cache. Vanguard cannot write-protect the page cache in this situation, since it detects cache allocation only on disk reads operation. To avoid this problem, we adopt a simple but efficient solution: before using the sensitive files, we demand users to conduct a fingerprint check, such as MD5 comparison. If guest OS has already tampered page cache by overwriting the file, the fingerprint will not match anymore, then we detect the attack before it actually causes damages. Note that cache attack may still occur after a valid fingerprint check and our cache level protection will be effective then, because the file content will be loaded into the page cache after fingerprint check and write protection is activated correspondingly.
3) RECLAMATION DETECT AND RELEASING WRITE PROTECTION
Vanguard must also be aware when a cache page has been freed by guest OS. However, the guest OS will not explicitly notify the VMM when it frees a page. In performance considerations, we also can not always monitor the guest kernel's free-list. Therefore, Vanguard detects page reuse instead of detecting when a page is being free. Because reuse indicates that the page has been reclaimed, and it is easier to realize than directly detecting page reclamation.
Modern operating systems usually allocate memory pages lazily. In normal conditions, operating systems do not immediately assign memory pages when processes request it. Instead, they make reservation and assign it on-demand (e.g. page fault mechanisms). This kind of on-demand allocating will not notify VMM in memory full virtualization mode (when EPT or RVI is enabled). Fortunately, after reallocating, initial values will be written to these pages. At this time, page-fault will be triggered since we activate write protection in the previous allocating process. When it detects a page fault whose cause is trying to write a readonly page, Vanguard will perceive that the pages are being reused and thus to release the write protection. The problem remains, however, malicious operations which try to access and contaminate the cache will also incur the same type of page-fault. So, Vanguard scopes into the guest to identify different cases:
1 Copy-on-write mapping in guest OS will not cause the false positives, since the not-writable permission is set on the second level page table (Guest Physical Address to Host Virtual Address). 
Reuse as Other Kinds of Page:
Guest OS may use a reclaimed page as other kinds of page than page-cache, e.g. application's anonymous page. In this case, the page type in the guest OS will be changed from page cache to anonymous page. The virtual address will also be changed too (page cache is usually in a fix virtual address range). These features can help Vanguard to know that the page is reused as other kinds of page.
Malicious Access: Vanguard does not affirm a page reuse when observing page faults that are due to malicious access to the cache. Since the page has not been reused in this case, the page type and the virtual address will remain as the same as the original value. Furthermore, the page will be still associated with the corresponding file. Vanguard can get the accurate conclusion by casting the file attributes from OS-specific information of the page.
Reuse as Page Cache: Guest OS may also use a reclaimed page as page-cache. This is the most sophisticated case. In this case, One possibility is that other disk sectors are going to be read to this page. As mentioned in Section V-A, Vanguard intercepts every disk IO operation. So Vanguard will signal that the previous page has been reused if a new disk read associated with the same memory address is detected. However, there is also another possibility that a page of data is going to write to disk and the page does not already exist in the page cache, thus the OS allocates a new page to buffer the data until it is written to disk. Page-fault will also be triggered since this is equivalent to allocating a page and copying the data to it. Vanguard distinguishes this kind of page-fault from malicious-access-caused page-fault by observing the page's associated file, because the associated file of the page will be changed in this case. Initially, Vanguard is in VM Running states. When VM requests disk IO, the program will turn to IO emulator, hence the state will transit to Disk IO Handling. At this time, Vanguard uses previously defined monitoring strategies and page-cache reuse detecting strategies to check the IO Request. If the request breaks the security policy, Vanguard will deter the current IO instruction and then return to VM. There is another possibility that the IO operation might intend to read readonly file or incur sensitive page-cache reuse, in this case, Vanguard should update cache location of sensitive files and return to VM afterward.
Since we make sensitive files' cache be readonly, When VM tries to write these caches, Vanguard's states will transit to Page-Fault on Cache by capturing page fault. In this state, Vanguard judges whether the cache page has been reused. If so, we update cache location of sensitive files and return to VM. On the contrary, if the page is still cached in memory, we will deter current instruction before VM returns.
VI. IMPLEMTATION
We implement Vanguard on qemu-kvm-2.4.1 with Linux kernel 3.13.0-amd64. Qemu-KVM has already realized the functions of disk IO handler, page-permission configuration, and page-fault handler, etc. Therefore, to reduce the cost of development, we decide to add monitoring functions based on the existing codes. We achieve the IO access control and cache allocation detection modules by adding additional functions in original disk IO emulation codes. In the original page-fault handler, we insert function which introscopes the upper guest OS to distinguish and handle the cases of page reuse and malicious access. In addition, we implement two new modules. One builds the relation between disk sectors and files, while the other handles affairs when the malicious operation is detected.
Vanguard's implementation mainly includes the above four parts. In the rest part of this section, we will present implementation in detail. Although it is specific to QEMU/KVM, it can port to other VMMs with the same techniques and design methodologies.
A. DISK SEMANTIC RECONSTRUCTION
We go straightforward to reconstruct the semantic view of virtual disk by imitating the corresponding device drivers as well as file system drivers of the guest OS. It is convenient because the file system drivers are open-source in Linux developing environments and the device drivers are also off-the-shelf in Qemu. We directly reuse the device driver in Qemu, since it can shield the difference of the underlying virtual disk format (Qcow2, VMDK and etc.) and provide raw data to upper file system driver. The upward interface that Qemu's device driver provides is bdrv_read_em(). So we modify the file system driver to make it adapt to bdrv_read_em(). These two-level drivers constitute the basis to build the semantic relationship between files and block sectors.
Each time a VM starts, Vanguard executes the disk semantic reconstruction only once. The input is the file privileges configuration, while the output is two bitmaps. In this process, we find out the sectors associated with each sensitive file and fill them into the corresponding bitmaps. One bitmap is called readonly bitmap and it represents for sectors associated with readonly files; The other is called non-accessible bitmap and it is for sectors associated with non-accessible files. Both of the bitmaps use sector number as the index (e.g. if 17th sector associates with readonly file, 17th bit of the readonly bitmap should set True). The sector is in neither of the two bitmaps indicates that it is free to access. For per GB virtual disk size, the bitmaps will cost 0.5MB additional space.
B. IO HANDLER
In IO Handler, readonly bitmaps and non-accessible bitmap mentioned in previous subsections are important parameters. Vanguard firstly gets the sector to be read or write and checks whether the IO operation is legal by validating which bitmap the sector belongs to. The legal IO operations will be allowed. While for illegal one, we terminate the IO so that the malicious access will be hopped stealthily and then we record all the malicious access in Vanguard's log. Specially, in case of loading readonly sectors into memory, Vanguard clears the secondary page table entry's PT_WRITABLE_MASK bit to remove the write access of the physical page. In other cases, the PT_WRITABLE_MASK bit should turn back to 'enable'.
C. PAGE-FAULT HANDLER
Page-fault will arise when readonly pages are being written. As mentioned in Section V-B, both page reuse and malicious access will cause the page-fault. So Vanguard should distinguish them in page-fault handler. We can make a preliminary judgment by checking the virtual address of the page. If the virtual address has been changed, it indicates that the page has been reused and then we can allow the write operation and release the write protection. If the virtual address is unchanged, it means that the page is still in cache, so we will take use of VM introspection to make the further decision.
1) INTROSPECTION IN LINUX GUEST
In Linux kernel, the information of the page is stored in page descriptor. All the page descriptors lie in mem_map kernel array. Mem_map is located in the guest's virtual address started from 0xffffea0000000000, and it uses the page's physical frame number (pfn) as the index. As illustrated in Figure 3 , from page descriptor, we can find the address_space, and then get the corresponding inode from address_space. Note that the page now caches the contents of this inode. So if this inode represents an ordinary file, we should allow this write access by removing the write protection of this page (setting PT_WRITABLE_MASK bit to 'enable') and resuming the VM. On the contrary, when this inode represents a readonly file, we should deter the write access by skipping current instruction.
2) INTROSPECTION IN WINDOWS GUEST
The method used in Windows kernel is almost the same as in Linux, we also use pfn to find the file which is cached in the target page. Figure 4 demonstrates the details. Through the clues in the figure, we finally find the corresponding file object and thus to decide whether allows or forbid this write access. 
3) MULTIPLE PLATFORMS SUPPORT
In different versions of the operating system, the data structure may have subtle changes. To adapt different operating systems, we recognize the kernel versions of guest OS by distinguishing the interrupt descriptor table which varies significantly across OS versions, and then choose the proper structure definition to conduct introspection.
D. MALICIOUS OPERATION HANDLER
When Malicious Operation is detected, this module will be forked. In this module, we record and log the context of this operation including the target file, current process name, process id, etc. After logging the operation, we attempt to kill the process which invokes this IO operation by injecting kill signal to corresponding process control blocks. More specifically, for Linux guest OS, we inject SIGKILL (value 9) to the field of pending in task_struct; For windows guest, we set the Terminated bit in EPROCESS. We adopt the method proposed in VMDetector to locate task_struct and EPROCESS.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we perform a set of experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness and overhead of the system. We firstly evaluate Vanguard's ability to monitor the file integrity in both IO-level and cache-level. Then we discuss the ability of Vanguard to accurately detect cache reuse. We conclude by evaluating Vanguard under several workloads to characterize the impact on VM performance incurred by Vanguard.
A. ENVIRONMENTAL SETUP
We setup the experiments on a host, which is configured with Intel Core i7-6700 3.4GHz processors, 16GB DDR memory, a 1000GB WD disk with 7200 RPM and Intel I219-LM Gigabit NIC card. The operating system on physical server is Ubuntu 14.04 with 3.13.0-amd64 kernel. The virtual machines are configured with 2 vcpus, 4GB RAM and 100GB Disk unless specified otherwise. We choose four typical workloads inside the VM:
Idle workload means that the VM does nothing except the tasks of OS self after boot-up.
File Compression and Decompression workloads are common operations in file system. We use zip [34] algorithm to compress and decompress Linux kernel source.
IOzone is a professional benchmark for file system, which is widely applied. IOzone [35] is used for measuring the overhead of Vanguard.
Kernel Compilation is a development workload involving memory and disk IO operations. We compile the Linux 3.13.0 kernel by default configures.
B. ABILITY TO MONITOR THE FILE INTEGRITY
To verify the effectiveness of our approach, we simulate malicious attacks that try to access the sensitive files. The experimental results illustrate that Vanguard is able to monitor the file integrity in both IO-level and cache-level.
In this experiment, we configure a non-accessible file (/home/a) and a read-only file (/home/b), the rest files are all ordinary files. Then we boot up the monitored system. After the system starts, we login the root account to simulate the attacker who gains root privilege by exploiting the vulnerabilities. Afterwards, We firstly use command ''cat /home/a'' to print the contents of the non-accessible file, but due to the existence of Vanguard, all the printed contents are fallacious.
Secondly, we open /home/b using vim. It is successfully opened because /home/b is readonly file. Then we modify the file and save it. We reopen /home/b within a short period so that the cache will remain in the memory. And we can see that the file has not been modified. It proves that Vanguard can provide the readonly files' cache from being modified. Accordingly, no change will be flush to disk either. Figure 5 illustrates the log of Vanguard generated in the experiment. In this log, we can see that each malicious operation along with the identity and information about process that breaks the rule.
C. ABILITY TO ACCURATELY DETECT CACHE REUSE
To evaluate the ability of Vanguard to accurately detect cache reuse, we modified the Guest Linux kernel to generate the real cache reuse trace, and then compare it with what Vanguard detects. The workload we choose is file compression and kernel compilation. The comparative result shows that our approach can accurately detect cache reuse. Table 3 shows the proportions of different types of cache reuse under different workloads. 
D. ABILITY TO SUPPORT MULTIPLE PLATFORMS
To evaluate the compatibility of Vanguard, We perform the same experiment described in the last subsection on different versions of guest OSes and see if Vanguard can always work properly. We choose Windows Xp/7/8, Debian7, Ubuntu 14.04, CentOS 6.5 and Vanguard does work on all of them. These results demonstrate that our approach is able to support multiple platforms.
E. VANGURAD OVERHEAD
Monitoring sensitive file integrity in the background will no doubt incur performance loss, especially for IO performance. Therefore, in this subsection, we compare the performance of our method with original qemu.
We measure the efficiency of file compression and decompression in both Linux guest and Windows guest. We use zip algorithm to compress and decompress Linux-3.13.0 kernel source. All the files in the directory arch/x86 are set as sensitive files. The version of the guests are Ubuntu-14.04-amd64 and Windows7-pro-x86 respectively, which is the same in the following experiments. Table 4 depicts the result of the first set of comparative experiments. The overhead brought by Vanguard is less than 8.11%
We also measure the read and write speeds with iozone using the same experimental environment. We open and read a 1GB sensitive file and then run the IOzone. By running IOzone in the VM started by Vanguard and original QEMU respectively, we get the VM's average speeds of reading/writing a 16MB file with different blocks sizes (4KB 16384KB). As demonstrated in Figure 6 . With the blocks size increasing, Vanguard and the original QEMU's I/O speeds both climb up and then decline. The average overhead incurred by Vanguard range from 8.21% and 10.16%.
At last, we estimate the overhead by kernel compilation experiment. We test different number of sensitive files in the experiment. From the experimental result in Figure 7 , we can see that the number of the sensitive files does not affect performance of Vanguard significantly, this is because that we use the bitmaps data structure and all the search complexity is O(1) regardless of the sensitive file number. On the other hand, the results also illustrate that the average overhead in kernel compilation is about 2.1%. This is lower than previous two experiments, since there are too much IO which will trigger the monitor process in the IOzone and file compression.
In general, the experimental results show that the overhead incurred by Vanguard is acceptable, especially in kernel compilation, which is more close to the real-world load involving both IO and other operations. 
VIII. LIMITATIONS
In this section, we discuss the limitations of Vanguard in several aspects.
A. KERNEL SUBVERTING
Vanguard assumes a trustworthy VMM to prevent untrusted processes inside a monitored VM from affecting Vanguard. In Vanguard, we introscope guest VM states for detecting the page reuse. As such, an attacker could intentionally tamper the key kernel structure which will be detected in Vanguard, and it will lead the introspection solutions to providing false information [36] . However, this kind of attack can be defended by other existing techniques, such as SGX [13] and kernel integrity monitoring [15] , [23] .
B. PRE-CONFIGURING
Vanguard does not support configuration of the sensitive file while monitored VM is running. If the VM owners want the configuration to take effect, they must restart the VMs. This influences the availability of Vanguard.
C. NONSUPPORT FOR DISK PASS-THROUGH
Pass-through is a mechanism working with Intel vt-d [37] which enables VM to access virtual disk directly. And It will enhance the efficiency of IO virtualization. The IO operation will no more trigger the VM-exit in a VM with pass-through virtual disk. However, in Vanguard, we need to intercept and analyze all the disk IO operations of monitored VM. Therefore, Vanguard cannot monitor a VM which uses passthrough and direct-IO mechanism.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose Vanguard, an efficient runtime sensitive file integrity monitoring tool in VMM. Different from existing monitor tools which only provide IO-level monitor, Vanguard can also monitor the sensitive files already loaded into cache. To achieve cache-level monitoring, we identify the memory region which needs to be monitored by exploring the techniques to detect when pages are added to or removed from the OS page cache. We implemented Vanguard on QEMU/KVM platform and conduct several experiments. The experimental results imply that our method is capable of monitoring sensitive files in both cache-level and IO-level. And it is also compatible with either Linux or Windows guest OS. The overall overhead incurred by Vanguard is less than 10.16% under the promise of correctness.
In the future, we plan to optimize implementation and enable users to configure the file protection-level in real-time. In addition, we plan to evaluate Vanguard using real-world attacks.
BIN SHI received the bachelor's degree from the School of Computer Science and Engineering, Beihang University, in 2013, where he is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree in computer software and theory under the supervision of J. Huai. His research interests include cloud computing, operating system, system virtualization, system security, and hybrid cloud. LIU OUYANG received the B.Eng. degree in computer science from Zhejiang University in 2000. She is currently a member of State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co., Ltd. VOLUME 6, 2018 
